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To Die Laughing and to Laugh at Dying:
Revisiting The Awakening*
Anca Parvulescu
It is when I collapse that I have a start.
—George Bataille

T

ime has come to reread The Awakening. In new times, it might
be worth giving our texts another chance, let them run another
risk. We might learn to open our ears to other things, familiar
things that nevertheless might ring otherwise. The present reading
revisits this well-known novel through a reconsideration of the apparently familiar notion of awakening. An encounter will be staged between
the text of The Awakening and that of George Bataille’s Inner Experience.
Awakening will thus come to read “awakening-unto-death,” awakening
qua recognition and acceptance of the fact of death, the absolute limit
of experience and knowledge. The moment at the very end of the novel,
the moment Edna is ready to embrace the unknown of the sea, will be
identified as the promise of this awakening. A last image this reading will
risk will be that of an Edna beyond the novel, an Edna laughing while
swimming. The events preceding and supposedly leading to this ending
will be read as a story of intoxication, an intoxication meant to avoid or
at least postpone the moment of awakening as awakening-unto-death.
Given that this novel is one of the most important texts of the
American feminist literary canon, the consequences of such a rereading
for feminist theorizing need to be considered. In other words, if this is a
seminal text for feminism, how does a rereading in such terms affect the
way we think about feminism? I will engage this problem by reversing
the usual question of the relation between feminism and a literary text.
Instead of attempting to read and thus, in Derridean terms, sign a novel
for feminism, I will be interested in a feminism for the novel. Indeed,
what kind of feminism do we need for this novel? We have to listen to
Edna first.
* I am grateful to Paula Rabinowitz, Jani Scandura, John Mowitt, and Karen Steigman for
their comments on earlier versions of this essay.
New Literary History, 2005, 36: 477–495
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I. What does Edna want?
The double. Edna’s drama is that she experiences herself as double.
There is an empirical self living in “the world” and going about its daily
routine, and there is a self-reflective self that meditates on the empirical
self and has insights into its fiction. Here is the flashback introducing
the motif of the double: “At a very early period she had apprehended
instinctively the dual life—that outward existence which conforms, the
inward life which questions.”1 The novel thematizes a tension—the
tension within a self that lives itself as double, as oscillation between an
“outward” life in which one “conforms” and an “inward” life in which
one “questions”: “He [Mr. Pontellier] could see plainly that she was not
herself. That is, he could not see that she was becoming herself and daily
casting aside that fictitious self which we assume like a garment with
which we appear before the world” (A 57). What the inward life
questions is the conformity of the everyday life and, with it, everything
that is everyday, normal. While “unthinking” and “habit” characterize
outward life, “stubbornness” and “resistance” characterize inward life:
“Another time she would have gone in at his [Mr. Pontellier’s] request.
She would, through habit, have yielded to his desire; not with any sense
of submission or obedience to his compelling wishes, but unthinkingly,
as we walk, move, sit, stand, go through the daily treadmill of the life
which has been portioned out to us. . . . With a writhing motion she
settled herself more securely in the hammock. She perceived that her
will had blazed up, stubborn and resistant. She could not at that
moment have done other than denied and resisted” (A 32).
This is not an easy life. Because this instability, this oscillation or
flickering, is constantly and painfully revealing the vulnerability of the
self. It is lived through—sudden, “instinctive”—moments of rupture
when one momentarily passes from a state of nonseeing to one of
seeing. These moments of rupture, when one moves from the so-called
empirical self to the self-reflexive self, but when, for a blink-of-the-eye
instant, one “is” neither one nor the other, are experienced as an insight
into death. Thus, the flickering, when lived in this acute form, is felt as
a chilling moment of anguish, of a certain kind of terror. Through its
experience, Edna sees herself and the world around her with new eyes,
and both are revealed to be “grotesque” (A 58). Edna’s husband,
Léonce, is the embodiment of this world. We will therefore consider
what he is, so we can understand what Edna resists both in “the world”
and within herself.
The world. The first thing we abruptly find out about Léonce Pontellier’s
physical appearance is that he wears eyeglasses. He is distinguished not
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so much by the fact that he does not see very well but that his eyes are
covered. In the opening scene, he is presented as compensating for this
blocked vision with his struggle to focus, to “apply himself” (A 3) to
reading. And focus not on anything but the newspaper, on exhausting
what the newspaper has to offer after the most important parts—the
financial ones—have already been processed. Despite his “application,”
within the dynamics of vision-metaphors proposed by the novel, he is
and will remain the character that cannot see. A “colorless existence” (A
57) lived in “blind contentment” (A 57) characterize him and “the
world” he stands for. In contradistinction, Edna’s eyes are “quick and
bright” (A 5), and hers is a struggle to see better and, finally, to simply see.
Léonce’s first words to Edna, at the beginning of the novel, are
anticipatory of the reaction she will stir: “What folly!” (A 4). Indeed, the
place “the world” has for Edna is that of folly, a place she shares with
children, to whom she is often compared through their common
preoccupation with “some utter nonsense” (A 5). In the world Mr.
Pontellier represents, Edna’s attempt at self-reflection renders her “odd”
(A 65). When faced with the threat of intimate proximity to this oddity,
which, we later find out, is first and foremost a threat to his finances, Mr.
Pontellier needs to struggle to maintain his “composure” (A 8) so he can
go on with his serious business. It is this “composure” that best
characterizes “the world,” an insistence on maintaining a social mask in
the face of which Edna is ready to laugh. It is therefore the spectacle
offered by her agelast husband,2 the spectacle of his fight for composure,
that ultimately makes Edna stop playing the game. Which is not to say
that Mr. Pontellier is a bad husband. On the contrary, he is the perfect
husband: “Mr. Pontellier was the best husband in the world. Mrs.
Pontellier was forced to admit she knew of none better” (A 9). And this
is his problem. He behaves the way he is supposed to, that is, the way the
conventions Edna begins to question have it. What he needs to do, and
needs to have Edna do, is “keep up with the procession” (A 51), while
Edna needs to think about the procession as a procession, to “realize her
position in the universe as a human being, and to recognize her
relations as an individual to the world within and about her” (A 15).
Edna begins to see the world of Mr. Pontellier as a “grotesque
pandemonium” (A 58)—grotesque in the etymological sense of grottoesque or cave-like. The dinner party she devotes herself to organizing
thus becomes a reversed wedding that marks her departure from the
grotto as matrimonial pandemonium (“a place represented by Milton as
the capital of Hell”).3 The luxury, the “veritable Lucullean feast” (A
111), into which Edna transforms this mock-wedding with “sèvres,
flowers, music, and champagne to swim in” (A 85), anticipates her entry
into a different economy in which expenditure is absolute or not at all.
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The advocate of this envisioned economy is here the sumptuous,
enormous, necessarily very expensive, exuberant piece of jewelry that
Edna chooses to wear on this occasion—“a magnificent cluster of
diamonds that sparkled, that almost sputtered in Edna’s hair” (A 86).
Like the champagne, enough to swim in, the cluster of diamonds is
necessarily of hyperbolic dimensions. In its sputtering, its explosive
effect, it is the promise of a “grand affair” (A 85), of a veritable “coup
d’état” (A 85). Of course, Léonce Pontellier is the advocate of expenditure too: he encourages Edna to go shopping, and he is always ready to
invest in remodeling their “charming house.” But his is a calculated,
typical bourgeois expenditure.4 His spending is a form of investment: he
invests in himself, in the reproduction of his wealth. Edna’s economy
will ultimately renounce calculation in favor of absolute exaggeration.5
In a brilliant ironic twist, the husband-to-be-left is appropriately left to
pay the bills of this wedding.
It is “the world” as an unthinking, habitual “procession” that Edna
resists. And, more importantly, her own self as it unthinkingly walks,
moves, sits, stands, goes through the daily treadmill of a life that has
been “portioned out” to her within the “procession.” “Thinking about
thinking” (A 17) is a mode of self-reflection that does not allow for the
“procession” to fully control her. But it is also an experience of terror. It
is a modern experience of radical questioning, of finding oneself
without anchorage in ideals such as that of the “mother-woman” or of
the “artist.” In order to be able to still live in “the world” with this
painfully flickering consciousness, the self devises means of dealing with
the terror, of covering it up through a process of intoxication. Intoxication will be the temporary answer to the terror of radical interrogation.
Intoxication. There are moments when Edna seems to experience a
certain awakening. An awakening to what?—has been the main question
asked by Chopin criticism. Most often, the answer has suggested a sexual
awakening.6 But these moments are described in the novel in the
language of at least two registers, one being indeed the language of
awakening, and the other being the language of intoxication.7 The
latter is often overlooked, or otherwise not discussed in the same breath
with awakening. When the two are, however, grasped together, the text
consents to a different reading. What we have in these cases is not
awakening per se but something like a dream of awakening made
possible by an intoxication-induced sleep. This dreamlike state gives the
self-reflective self the illusion of identity with the empirical self. Dreams,
however, only function as further putting to sleep. Only at the very end
of the novel, when the dream seems to approach the point of its
interruption and leave room for a state of indefinite insomnia, the
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promise of awakening finds its possibility. It is not when one dreams
about the awakening, but when one dreams about dreaming, that one is
close to awakening: “The years that are gone seem like dreams—if one
might go on sleeping and dreaming—but to wake up and find—oh!
well! perhaps it is better to wake up after all, even to suffer, rather than
to remain dupe to illusions all one’s life” (A 110). If Edna perceives her
life as a dream, this moment is the closest one can get to awakening: We
are close to waking when we dream about dreaming.8 The end of the novel
does just that—it brings us “close.” It is an anticipation, a promise of an
awakening. But when the story ends, the awakening is still to come. This
is why the novel, while anticipating the awakening, is, in terms of its story
if not in its spirit, a tale of intoxication.
And intoxication will take different forms. There is, for example, a
certain comfort in tears, a sensuousness even: “An indescribable oppression, which seemed to generate in some unfamiliar part of her consciousness, filled her whole being with a vague anguish. It was like a
shadow, like a mist passing across her soul’s summer day. It was strange
and unfamiliar; it was a mood. She did not sit there inwardly upbraiding
her husband, lamenting at Fate, which had directed her footsteps to the
path which they had taken. She was just having a good cry all to herself”
(A 8). The experience is indescribable, untraceable to any recognizable
cause, familiar and strange at the same time, a shadow, a mist, a mood.
A “good cry” functions as a means to soften the experience, to make it
less painful, to amortize it. What seems to be a progression toward an
even more painful self-awareness is solved by a “good cry,” by the
expenditure of tears. Later on, this moment is described as “the
midnight when she had abandoned herself to tears” (A 14). Indeed, this,
like any experience of intoxication, is an abandonment that temporarily
covers up the pain of the double.
It would be insufficient to say that what Edna wants is power, even if
that only means power over her own self. Because power too finds its way
in the novel through a language of intoxication. The moment of power
is the moment of learning to swim. After having tried all summer,
success is a moment of glory: “‘How easy it is!’ she thought. ‘It is
nothing,’ she said aloud; ‘why did I not discover before that it was
nothing. Think of the time I have lost splashing about like a baby!’ She
would not join the groups in their sports and bouts, but intoxicated with
her newly conquered power, she swam out alone” (A 29). The insight
into the easiness of swimming functions as the moment of “I can do
anything!” The flying Mademoiselle Reisz suggests is another variant of
this swimming: “The bird that would soar above the level plain of
tradition and prejudice must have strong wings” (A 82). Swimming and
flying are metaphors of woman’s access to power. Now Edna knows she
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can do things: she can stay outside when her husband asks her to go
inside, she can paint and make money, she can leave her husband’s
house and move into her own, she can give her love to whomever she
chooses, she can have illicit sex, she can die of her own free will. She can
become a “regal woman, the one who rules, who looks on, who stands
alone” (A 88). But power too is a narcotic that can only temporarily cover
up the anguish of the double. The conclusion of the first swim episode—
the encounter with death and subsequent retreat from the encounter—
can only be explained though her state of intoxication. The narcotic of
power stops Edna from facing anguish, from going toward the ultimate
experience that will be pushed to its limit only at the end of the novel.
Love, the novel seems to suggest, is the best narcotic. And especially
when combined with Mademoiselle Reisz’s music, as during the reading
of Robert’s letter. But love is privileged by Edna only insofar as she is
anticipated, indeed, expected, to take a lover both by Madame Ratignolle
and by Doctor Mandelet—and, indeed, pushed by them, by the reader.
Love is the narcotic in which, within the sequence of events in the novel,
Edna puts her last hope: “When she thought that he was there at hand,
waiting for her, she grew numb with the intoxication of expectancy” (A
110). But, again, numbness is a fugitive state. Soon, love too is revealed
as another delusion, for Robert does not understand, Robert cannot and
will never understand. Robert and the love he advocates for are finally
unmasked as part and parcel of the “procession”:
“You have been a very, very foolish boy, wasting your time dreaming of
impossible things when you speak of Mr. Pontellier setting me free! I am no
longer one of Mr. Pontellier’s possessions to dispose of or not. I give myself
where I choose. If he were to say, ‘Here, Robert, take her and be happy; she is
yours,’ I would laugh at you both.”
His face grew a little white. “What do you mean?” he asked. (A 106)

At the end of the novel, Edna indeed laughs at them both. And
especially at the “both” that Léonce Pontellier and Robert Lebrun
constitute, after all. This is a “both” founded in their shared idea of love
as necessarily marital, contractual. Edna has hopes for another kind of
love. While Robert dreams of an exchange, with himself and Mr.
Pontellier as exchangers, Edna dreams the wild dream of escaping the
exchange system: “I give myself where I choose.” The answer to Robert’s
question (“What do you mean?”)—a question that, by extension, can be
said to be the question “the world,” including that of Chopin criticism,
asks—will fail to come. What does come, however, or at least promises to
come, is the moment of laughter Edna anticipates here and that might
be the only answer to Robert’s question.
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Painting, another suggested solution to Edna’s torment, is yet another
form of intoxication. Here is Mademoiselle Reisz’s aesthetic credo:
“To be an artist includes much; one must possess many gifts—absolute gifts—
which have not been acquired by one’s own effort. And, moreover, to succeed,
the artist must possess the courageous soul.”
“What do you mean by the courageous soul?”
“Courageous, ma foi! The brave soul. The soul that dares and defies.” (A 63)

What other words could describe Edna better than “the brave soul that
dares and defies”? Yet, she does not “succeed,” not only because painting
is not a solution to Edna’s terror but also because “success” is not the
measure of her adventure. The end of the novel will therefore unmask
art, too, as a mystification that, as the episode of Edna reading Robert’s
letter suggests, goes hand in hand with the romance scenario Edna
leaves behind. Edna has dared and defied but it was all an illusion. Not
even art, often the idealized escape strategy, can conquer terror.
Then there is sex. Here is the scene that introduces Edna to eroticism:
“She lit a candle and went up to her room. Alcée Arobin was absolutely
nothing to her. Yet his presence, his manners, the warmth of his glances,
and above all the touch of his lips upon her hand had acted like a
narcotic upon her” (A 77). Note that she thinks about her relationship
with Alcée Arobin and that she prepares for the experience. She decides
to have sex with him. The memory of his touch functions as a promise of
an even stronger intoxicant. She will try sex with a man she does not
care about, thus dissociating the two intoxicants usually brought together by tradition: love and sex. She tries them separately, as if to
increase their power.
Finally, gambling: “The fever of the game flamed in her cheeks and
eyes, and it got into her blood and into her brain like an intoxicant” (A
74). Betting at the races describes the essence of the intoxicant: it is a
temporary fever. It does not matter so much if one wins, although
winning does add to the excitement. What matters is, like in the episode
of the luxurious dinner, the passion of spending. When the effects of the
fever are over, however, one is left blank, in a painful state that does not
find comfort: “I feel as if I had been wound up to a certain pitch—too
tight—and something inside me snapped” (A 91). After the pitch of
intoxication—whether intoxication takes the form of tears, power, love,
art, sex, or gambling—there can only be a “snap.”
The sea. Here is Mr. Pontellier: “She’s got some notion in her head
concerning the eternal rights of women” (A 65). “Eternal” seems to be
the word around which Edna’s behavior can be understood: her desire
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functions in a time for which we use the word “eternal” and in referring
to which an imagery of the sea and the ocean seems appropriate. The
motif of the eternal is introduced for the first time through the image of
a “meadow that seemed as big as the ocean” (A 18). Edna has here her
first experience of “following a misleading impulse . . . idly, aimlessly,
unthinking and unguided” (A 18). It is an experience of terror and of
pleasure at the same time. It is an impulse but it is misleading, it lures
her into going toward something one knows one will never reach: “A
certain light was beginning to dawn dimly within her,—the light which,
showing the way, forbids it” (A 14). Her desire will be to follow this light
and ultimately see the sun. All the key moments in the novel need to
happen in the presence of the sun. Desire is thus, like the sun, a light
that shows the way and blocks sight at the same time. There are no
“pictures” in this space, no representations, only the “passions themselves were aroused within her soul, swaying it, lashing it, as the waves
daily beat upon her splendid body” (A 27). What Edna is doing is
“reaching out for the unlimited in which to lose herself” (A 47). Desire
is for abandonment, for the “unlimited.” In the quick glance at this
“unlimited,” during the episode of the first swim, Edna has an encounter
with death which is experienced as a “flash of terror” (A 29). Again, this
moment is not lived as utterly negative: “I never was so exhausted in my
life. But it isn’t unpleasant” (A 30). The encounter with death is lived as
the promise of the awakening. It gives insight into the necessity of
accepting the night of death, the anguish of death, as the only means of
approaching the desired sun. It is only in the midst of darkness, only
from within the abyss of the sea, that flight toward the sun is possible.
The terror is overwhelming though, and at this point in the story Edna
needs and welcomes what she thinks is the best intoxicant: love. The
moment of terror will be pushed to its limit only at the end of the novel,
after love too has been uncovered as soporific.
Edna’s desire is directed toward “something unattainable” (A 33),
something that would rupture the anchorage that has held her so far
and would permit her to see. But the mode in which the novel describes
these moments is one of “not yet.” Edna is never close to achieving her
desire, which necessarily is and will always be a “not yet,” a striving and
a foreclosure and a permanent postponement. It is only from beyond
the novel, from after the experience at the end of the novel, that this
“not yet” is to be realized. The time of desire is the future perfect: we do
not know what it will have brought. Within the novel, Edna can only
resist the “grotesque pandemonium” and strive toward “the unattainable,” which she intuitively anticipates as a “delirium”: “a pity for the
colorless existence which never uplifted its possessor beyond the region
of blind contentment, in which no moment of anguish visited her soul,
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in which she would never have the taste of life’s delirium. Edna vaguely
wondered what she meant by ‘life’s delirium.’ It had crossed her thought
like some unsought, extraneous impression” (A 57).
The experience. The awakening only happens at the end, better yet,
after the end of the novel. There is a progression toward this moment,
but the awakening is not a presence within the novel. Nor is the
progression a linear one—it is a series of moments whose order can be
reversed. In fact, Edna is closer to the experience of awakening at the
beginning of the novel, before the series of intoxications. But awakening
can only be linked to the experience at the end of novel. Awakening
only begins at the point of encounter with something that suspends
thought because it cannot be thought and desired at the same time—
death. At the end of the novel, thought is indeed suspended—“She was
not thinking of these things when she walked down to the beach” (A
113)—and what we have is a lived experience in which knowing and doing
merge. And this is the promise of a new beginning, of the awakening.
Time is divided at this point in the novel between a past as illusion, as
sleep, as intoxication, as ontological bad faith; a present “close” to an
awakening that is to be an instant, a flash, a burst of laughter; and a
future as a series of anticipated and predictable moments of relapse into
self-mystification, the danger of which is represented by “the children.”9
Edna thus needs to fight the always-present threat of “the children,” the
threat of becoming a mother-woman, a “mother for the race” (A 110), of
finding peace, comfort, happiness. The novel ends with the promise of
her finding a “way to elude them” (A 113), that is, “the children” but also
herself as intoxicated self, of finding a way to continuously foreground
the ontological bad faith. The sentence, “She understood now clearly
what she had meant long ago when she said to Adèle Ratignolle that she
would give up the unessential, but she would never sacrifice herself for
the children” (A 113), can only be understood in this light. Edna’s two
children as empirical beings are never in question, what is in question is
“the children,” the problem of “the children,” as the danger and the
temptation of belonging to the procession of mothers. This is the
problem that, in view of her seeing Adèle Ratignolle give birth, has no
solution: “The children appeared before her like antagonists who had
overcome her; who had overpowered and sought to drag her into the
soul’s slavery for the rest of her days” (A 113). Not “sacrificing herself for
her children” translates into another, more meaningful, more “essential,” form of sacrifice that she begins to envision now.
Feminism. Edna is not a feminist. At least not within the notion of
feminism that the text defines. She does not associate with the “pseudo-
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intellectual” women that Doctor Mandelet immediately thinks of and
that we now recognize as the suffragists of the day. The feminists as
suffragists want something; Edna does not want anything. Or she does not
know what she wants. Or she wants everything. In any case, her desire is
not recuperable within feminism.10 Granted, she is anything but a
representative of the eternal feminine described by Doctor Mandelet, as
she is aware she is quite unwomanly in her newly acquired “habit of
expressing [her]self” (A 104). She is also struggling to understand “what
character of a woman” (A 82) she is, giving the impression she might,
after all, share, at least in part, the plea of “the feminists.” But when one
of the “pseudo-intellectual” women is introduced at Edna’s farewell
dinner party, in the person of Miss Mayblunt, a paper-combatant, it is
more than clear that if the latter is writing under a nom de guerre, this is
not Edna’s guerre. She is not ironical toward the feminists, as the doctor
is, she even seems to understand their fight, but her stakes are simply
not there. She will not, in fact, want a guerre at all; she is, as suggested in
the same dinner episode, after a coup d’état.
The end. Does Edna commit suicide? Is Edna at the end “different and
diminished”? Is she “completely defeated”? Is she “destroyed”? Does she
“simply die”? Does she “collapse”?11 What Edna has is an experience of
death. Which does not necessarily mean she is dying. And if she is
“collapsing,” collapse is here by no means synonymous with “simply
dying.” Edna has a vision of death when swimming for the first time
and—terrified—she retreats from the encounter. Now, with the “collapse,” all narcotics having been tried, the moment of the awakening is
inevitable. Edna faces this moment naked: “she cast the unpleasant,
pricking garments from her, and for the first time in her life she stood
naked in the open air, at the mercy of the sun, the breeze that beat upon
her, and the waves that invited her” (A 113). The whole novel was written
for this moment and writing at this point staggers toward nakedness too.
Edna is now ready to confront death, to face death. Such is the nature of
her awakening: it is an awakening-unto-death. We do not know if she
dies, we only know she is ready to die. Or that she is ready to live as if
dead. This is the limit of knowing. From now on, there are “no plot
alternatives,”12 because there can be no “plot” at this point. Death is the
absolute unknowable. Edna enters an other space—the sea. And, as
opposed to the striated space of known, sedentary trajectories (and
plots) that she is leaving behind, the sea is a smooth space characterized
by a “polyvocality of directions.”13 At this point Edna cannot be
narrativized anymore, she has gone vagabonding on an unknown and
unknowable terrain. The novel ends. But this ending/no ending is a way
of saying no to the possibility of there being at this point a story of Edna.
She has become slippery, ungraspable.
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Readings of the novel find the ending frustrating in its abruptness.
Suicide makes sense and does not make sense. It makes sense within a
framework in which Edna is at the end of her story, she has tried
everything, but, as her final conversation with Robert shows, within “the
world,” the alternative to marriage is another marriage. Suicide marks
here a strong statement: woman is trapped, there is no way out. It does
not make sense if the context is “struggle.” There has been a progression
toward an emancipated and powerful Edna. She has had important
victories over “the world.” In other words, she has gone a long way; why
stop here? Both readings look for narrative closure when the novel
refuses one. Both need to know what happens to Edna when Edna gives
up the illusion to know what happens at that moment. She is finally
ready to welcome the smoothness of the unknown sea and its “delirium.”
A reading that looks for narrative closure is always performed in a
mode of “recuperation”: it resuscitates Edna, it “saves” her from the
unknown toward which she is moving. It is the symptom of the Oedipal
desire to know and to know to the end, to unveil the truth and through
the unveiling of the truth to cover Edna’s indecent nakedness. But
Edna’s invitation at the end of the novel is to resist the temptation of
resuscitation and to welcome the unknown of death, of the smooth sea.
In this sense, the text has predicted its own destiny, its early feminist
recuperation, through the episode of the first swim; but it has also
offered, through its ending, the strategy of resisting such recuperation.
Through a reading in the recuperation mode, the illusion of knowing is
recuperated at the level of reading. Edna is tamed, her desire is
understood, “the world” goes on without having heard the message. But
Edna is laughing, indeed, has the last laugh, and we can push our ears to
hear this laughter.
II. What does Edna want?
Disintoxication. The end of the novel shows Edna go to the limits of the
possible, the limits of knowing. Bataille has called this moment “inner
experience” and has referred to it as an awakening.14 This is where
thought begins for Bataille: “But what happens to us when, disintoxicated,
we learn what we are?”15 Bataille’s Inner Experience is concerned with the
moment immediately following disintoxication: What happens after the
love, the sex, the gambling, the tears, and the art? Bataille asks. He
answers, “I threw myself in the water.”16
Bataille is following G. W. F. Hegel, taking up Hegel’s challenge of a
need of a direct confrontation with death. In Hegel’s view, freedom
must look death in the face in its striving for “absolute knowledge.”
Bataille endorses Hegel’s insight up to what he sees as its “blind spot”:
the point where, in his view, Hegel maintains that life that is exposed to
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risk should nevertheless in the end be maintained, held back and
reinvested. In his revision of Hegel, Bataille thus calls for what Jacques
Derrida has coined “a Hegelianism without reserve,” an absolute negativity as the only possibility of exiting the “restricted economy” within
which we produce meaning. He asks for a complete abandonment in the
face of death and an absolute expenditure of the self.17 It is this
“Hegelianism without reserve” that I want to link to The Awakening’s
description of the moment immediately following intoxication, as a
“snap,” to suggest that the end of the novel, with its image of Edna
entering the sea, brings such a complete, absolute expenditure of the
self as an awakening-unto-death.
We do not know what happens at the moment of unreserved confrontation with death, but what we know is that this moment is not in any way
reassuring: “I abandon all hope for a logical harmony and dedicate
myself to improbability” (IE 70). Or, “I wanted experience to lead where it
would, not to lead it to some end point given in advance. And I say at
once that it leads to no harbor (but to a place of bewilderment, of
nonsense). I wanted non-knowledge to be its principle” (IE 3). The
experience of death as inner experience will solve nothing for us, it is
not a weapon or a tool in the general sense, we cannot invest in it. At this
point, “happiness” is out of the question, and “torment” is welcomed.
Inner experience is an experience of acute suffering; it is anguish, it is
terror. Let us call it death, Bataille will suggest: “I call experience a
voyage to the end of the possible of man” (IE 7). Death comes to be
perceived as a seductive opener of unknown paths: “Like a marvelous
madwoman, death unceasingly opened or closed the gates of the
possible” (IE xxxiii). Inner experience is an encounter with death, thus
neither “inner,” since it does not happen to a self, as there is no self in
death; nor “experience,” since there is no recognizable pattern of an
“event.” Inner experience is thus an ironic formulation that reveals the
limits of language. Ironic is also the connotation with awakening: inner
experience is an awakening only insofar as awakening is read as awakening, as a grammatically ambiguous verbal form of the root “wake.”
The irony of awakening is that it marks the impossibility of a juncture
between life and death, a juncture at which “The door must remain
open and shut at the same time” (IE 92). In a sense, “awakening,” like
“silence,” is an impossible word.
The wake. In order to talk about death, Bataille introduces the motif of
dramatization. Dramatization is played out between two selves. The selfreflective self goes to the limit of putting the empirical self to death:
“there is battle and rupture (there is no way out), between the desire to
give oneself completely to the bacchanalia which breaks out and
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destroys, and the concern to last, to participate in the bacchanalia
without being dead” (IE 194). In other words, there is desire to die and
there is desire to live to see oneself die. Bataille makes sense of this
impossible situation by referring to the Irish and Welsh tradition of the
wake. If “in order for man to reveal himself ultimately to himself, he
would have to die, but he would have to do it while living—watching
himself ceasing to be,”18 the wake gives him the means to envision such
a situation. The only way for us to experience death while living is by
means of a “subterfuge,” that is, through what Bataille calls “sacrifice”:
“In the sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies himself with the animal that he
struck dead. And so he dies seeing himself die, and even, in a certain
way, by his own will, one in spirit with the sacrificial weapon” (H 291).
The wake is a variant of sacrifice: “It is the death of an other, but in such
instances, the death of the other is always the image of one’s own death”
(H 291). One goes to a wake, eats and drinks with the dead man lying in
the open coffin, and sees oneself die. Moreover, in a sense, one kills the
dead person so one can witness death. In this, the prerequisite of inner
experience is dramatized: “Thus, at all costs, man must live at the
moment that he really dies, or he must live with the impression of really
dying” (H 287). Knowledge of death cannot do without this kind of
subterfuge, without dramatization, without sacrifice. And if Edna, in her
not wanting to “sacrifice herself for the children,” envisions another
form of sacrifice, then this sacrifice needs to be understood within this
dialogue with Bataille: sacrifice is the dramatization of the awakeningunto-death.
Awakening as a-wakening thus comes to bring together two meanings
of “wake”: (1) “vigil” or “funeral custom” (also used for “festival”) and
(2) the nautical term for “trace or track of a vessel in the water” (also
used for “the disturbance caused by a body swimming” or for “the aircurrents behind a body in flight”).19 Thus, the verb to a-wake: to put the
other and yourself to death in sacrifice and to watch that putting to
death and its trace in the self. Inner experience as awakening-untodeath is therefore death and birth at the same time: “it is necessary for
me to die (in my own eyes), to give birth to myself” (IE 34). The word
“necessary” must be emphasized here, since at this point the self has
reached the limits of the possible and death is seen as “delivering me
from a world that kills me” (IE 74). “It is when I collapse that I have a
start” (IE 153) is what Edna finally understands at the end of the novel.20
But this start is unknown, and it should remain unknown. It is a start
envisioned as a moment of laughter emerging in the midst of anguish.
Laughter. Here is Bataille describing the moment of inner experience
as an irruption of wild laughter: “A space constellated with laughter
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opened its dark abyss before me . . . I rushed into a sort of rapture. I
laughed divinely . . . I laughed as perhaps one had never laughed; the
extreme depth of each thing opened itself up—laid bare, as if I were
dead. . . . I was illuminated convulsively; I laughed, I imagine, while
running” (IE 34). My proposition is to imagine the sea in which Edna
swims as such a dark abyss constellated with laughter. To imagine her,
beyond the novel, after the moment when “the old terror flamed up for
a second, then sank again” (A 114), laughing divinely, laughing while
swimming. This would mean first of all to imagine her alive.21 But also to
imagine her in “ecstasy”: she finally sees, meaning, she finally sees things
as if she were dead. Things are laid bare. She is on a different terrain: “If
I attain, an instant, the extreme limit of the ‘possible,’ shortly thereafter,
I will flee, I will be elsewhere” (IE 36).
Laughter also marks the moment of inner experience as a moment of
pleasure. Here is Bataille: “[S]uch a flash was more desirable than erotic
pleasure. I don’t see anything: that is neither visible nor tangible in any
imaginable way; not intelligible. That renders painful and heavy the idea
of not dying” (IE 122). And here is Edna: “She felt like some new born
creature, opening its eyes in a familiar world it had never known” (A
113); or, “The touch of the sea is sensuous, enfolding the body in its soft,
close embrace” (A 113). It is this ultimately affirmative moment
(nonpositively affirmative, as Michel Foucault calls it reading Bataille),
the enjoyment and the laughter, that distinguishes Bataille’s account of
the encounter with death from other theories of finitude and that makes
it compatible with The Awakening.22
Bataille’s relation to “woman” is complicated.23 He, after all, wonders
about the “male character of effacement?” (IE 134). And, indeed, the
subject taking up Hegel’s challenge is male. But if woman does not have
access to “the extreme limit,” she is also absolutely necessary to “the
experience.” She is also that madwoman that allegorizes the promise of
death—“Like a marvelous madwoman, death unceasingly opened or
closed the gates of the possible” (IE xxxiii). She is, in other words, the
necessary mediator, that “like” that makes the thought of death possible
in the first place. And, with that, laughter too. For Bataille knows that
the “marvelous madwoman” is laughing. Jean-Luc Nancy, in his reading
of Bataille, dares the statement: “Perhaps it is always a woman’s laugh.”24
Edna literalizes the moment when, at the peak of “the experience,”
laughter is perhaps always a woman’s laugh, when Bataille’s laugh is
perhaps always Edna’s laugh. In following the scenario of “the self-thatdies” (IE 71), the “lost woman” as “marvelous madwoman” reaches the
moment of laughter in which she exceeds her “like” position and moves
toward another form of subjecthood—if it can still be called that—made
possible by “the experience.”
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Feminism. The question still is: what kind of feminism do we need for
this novel? And we might remember, with Maurice Blanchot, that “The
question is the desire for thought.”25 It is in the nature of the question
to persist in its asking and maybe to stubbornly insist in awaiting its
answers, which, however, given the question’s structure of desire, will be
in an asymptotical relation to the question, tending toward it without
ever hoping to appease it. As such an answer, I will try here to sketch an
image: what if we were to imagine feminism as an open, wild, exuberant
burst of laughter? In the wake of Edna’s experience, following the trace
of her disturbance in the water, this would mean to act as if we have been
through her experience, as if we are attending her wake. Attending
Edna’s wake, we “sacrifice” her and we dramatize death. This might be
the beginning of an awakening: we can thus learn to see, that is, see as if
our precious selves would be dead. A feminism that starts here, that
finds its enabling moment in a moment of laughter in which the subject
itself is dissolved but in which there is pleasure and joy, might have a
chance of being truly different. Feminist theorists have had glimmerings
of this idea for a long time. Hélène Cixous is probably best known for
her “Laugh of the Medusa.”26 But there are many other personages in
what might be said to constitute an emergent community of feminist
laughers.27 Yet a feminist “theory of laughter”—imagining a feminism of
laughter and a laughing feminism—still remains to be written. And, as it
should, the question awaits.
Community. Starting from Chopin’s initial subtitle for the novel, “The
Solitary Soul,” Edna’s experience has often been understood as an
expression of individualism, either masculine or feminine.28 Very often
questions of community formation and especially of a possible feminist
community emerging around this novel have been foreclosed by such
readings. But if we read the ending of the novel as an awakening-untodeath, what we have instead is precisely a moment of community
formation. Here is Bataille: “No doubt, it suffices that a single individual
reach the extreme limit: for all that, between him and the others—who
avoid him—he keeps a link. Without that he would only be an oddity,
not the extreme limit of the ‘possible’” (IE 38–39). Or, “inner experience is conquest and as such for others!” (IE 61). The Awakening is an
invitation to reconsider the oddity “the world” ascribes to Edna, to
acknowledge her experience as a dramatization of inner experience
and, as such, for others. Edna’s awakening opens the possibility of
community, because, as Bataille’s engagement with the notion of sacrifice suggests, it is always the death of another (or its dramatization) that
founds community. But this community is of necessity beyond what is
common (identity) and beyond the commonwealth (the contract).
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Therefore, a small, finite, fragile community that forms a “we,” that is
not the amplified form of a subject-I.29 To use a word dear to Bataille,
this is a formless community that redefines the word community as such
beyond recognition.
Inner experience is of necessity both a singular experience, because
the experience of death is a singular experience, and an experience that
has meaning only if it has meaning for others. Laughter becomes most
important at this point, because the moment of laughter is also the
moment when awakening acquires communal dimensions. In Bataille’s
words, “Each isolated existence emerges from itself by means of the
image betraying the error of immutable isolation. It emerges from itself
in a sort of easy flash; it opens itself at the same time to the contagion of
a wave which rebounds, for those who laugh, together become like the
waves of the sea—there no longer exists between them any partition as
long as the laughter lasts; they are no more separate than are two waves,
but their unity is as undefined, as precarious as that of the agitation of
the waters” (IE 96). To laugh is to enter the space of the smooth sea and,
with it, that of a fragile community of isolated existences. This is why
when we see Edna finally turning her head toward the abyssal sea we
have to imagine her laughing: die laughing and laugh at dying.30 And we
have to open ourselves to the contagion of that laughter, because, in its
being witness to Edna’s sacrifice, it offers the promise of a new
community, a new wave, not separated from other waves and yet
producing another sort of agitation of the waters.
University of Minnesota
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are representatives of l’esprit des serieux and, as such, cannot laugh and are hostile to
laughter. While Edna is ready to laugh in the face of “the world,” Léonce, with his
permanent preoccupation with the welfare of his finances, certainly makes a good
candidate for entry in Rabelais’s gallery of nonlaughers. Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World,
trans. Hélène Iswolsky (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 267.
3 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “pandemonium.”
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adventure is possible only for a middle-class woman, with enough (racialized) domestic
help to leave her space for painting or “thinking about thinking” (A 17). However, it is to
suggest that the dinner episode coupled with the ending of the novel allude to a different
economy that is an attack on bourgeois life.
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episode within the economy of the novel. See “The Second Coming of Aphrodite: Kate
Chopin’s Fantasy of Desire,” in Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, No Man’s Land: The Place
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of the Woman Writer in the Twentieth Century, vol. 2 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1989). For her, The Awakening is proposing “a feminist dream of a sexual culture beyond
culture” (93), and Edna is an “Aphrodite/Venus as an alternative to the patriarchal
western myth of Jesus” (96). In this framework, the dinner moment is interpreted as a
“Last Supper, a final transformation of will and desire into bread and wine, flesh and
blood, before the ‘regal woman’s’ inevitable crucifixion by a culture in which a regenerated Aphrodite has no viable role” (108). While this is a powerful reading of the novel, I
would argue that here luxury is not seen as luxury; it is read in a metaphorical key, thus
losing its subversive overtones as exaggeration: subversion of Mr. Pontellier’s world as a
world of calculated expenditure.
6 See Wendy Martin, ed., introduction to New Essays on The Awakening (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 1. Patricia Yaeger’s reading of the novel is the welcome
exception in this tradition. See Yaeger, “‘A Language Which Nobody Understood’:
Emancipation Strategies in The Awakening,” Novel: A Forum on Fiction 20, no. 3 (1987): 197–
219. Here is Yaeger: “[I]nsofar as feminist critics read Kate Chopin’s The Awakening as a
novel about sexual liberation, we read it with our patriarchal biases intact” (197). As an
alternative to a reading for such a plot, Yaeger offers an analysis of the novel’s linguistic
struggle for a “language which nobody understood.” Yaeger’s reading marks a turning
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experiences and responsibilities” (48–49). While Showalter is right to point to the
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“the world,” as childishness, immaturity.
8 This is Friedrich Schlegel’s Athenaeum Fragment 288, echoed by Jacques Lacan. See
Schlegel, Philosophical Fragments, trans. Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 58; and Jacques Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis, trans.
Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1981), 56–57.
9 I am using here—like in my engagement with subjectivity along the divide empiric/
self-reflexive—a vocabulary borrowed from Paul de Man. See de Man, “The Rhetoric of
Temporality,” in Blindness and Insight (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983),
187–228.
10 The Awakening can be said—and its nature as a “seminal” text might indeed reside
here—to have anticipated the later division within feminism between “reformers” and
“radicals.” Within this narrow divide, Edna would be on the radical side, the proponents of
which, especially on the French feminist scene, very often refuse the words “feminism” and
“feminist” as being appropriated by the reformers of the suffragist tradition. It is with such
observations in mind that one insists on revisiting those canonical texts that have “survived
the test of time”—and it is indeed ironical that The Awakening would today belong here.
(On this point, see Todd McGowan, The Feminine “No!”: Psychoanalysis and the New Canon
[Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001].) We revisit them because they have
formed us, because, as Barbara Herrnstein Smith argues, they are us. See Smith,
Contingencies of Value: Alternative Perspectives for Critical Theory, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1988).
11 George M. Spangler’s formulations. See Spangler, “Kate Chopin’s The Awakening: A
Partial Dissent,” Novel: A Forum on Fiction 3 (1970): 249–55. Starting from—and indeed
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often rejecting—this kind of reception of the novel, Chopin criticism has read the ending
of the novel as suicide. Suicide is understood in different, often contradictory, ways, but
the novel’s ending as suicide is almost never questioned. (For a review and critique of
suicide interpretations, see Robert Treu, “Surviving Edna: A Reading of the Ending of The
Awakening,” College Literature 27, no. 2 [Spring 2000]: 21–36). Even Rachel Blau DuPlessis,
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Awakening as suicide. See DuPlessis, Writing Beyond the Ending: Narrative Strategies of
Twentieth-Century Women Writers (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985). The
notable exception in this tradition is Gilbert’s reading. But even her position is ambivalent. She acknowledges that, if read realistically, the end of the novel shows Edna commit
suicide. If read metaphorically, however, Edna’s death, “if it is a death, it is a death
associated with a resurrection, a sort of pagan female Good Friday that promises an
Aphroditean Easter” (“The Second Coming of Aphrodite,” 109). In my reading, this
interpretation in a mythic key, to a large extent, forecloses the promise of Gilbert’s own
question, which I believe should be pursued all the way: “And how, after all, do we know that
she ever dies?” (“The Second Coming of Aphrodite,” 110; emphasis in original).
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Guattari. See Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,
trans. Brian Massumi (London: Athlone Press, 1988), 382. They identify the steppe, the
desert, and the sea as horizonless, smooth (lisse) spaces of the rhizome type. See also Paula
Rabinowitz’s reading of The Awakening, offering a powerful image of Edna at the end of the
novel entering her canvas (Rabinowitz, “Swimming into the Canvas,” MS).
14 George Bataille, The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge, trans. Michelle Kendall and
Stuart Kendall (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 175. On Bataille and
awakening see also Denis Hollier, “The Dualist Materialism of Georges Bataille,” in
Bataille: A Critical Reader, ed. Fred Botting and Scott Wilson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 59–
73.
15 Bataille, Inner Experience, trans. Leslie Anne Boldt (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1988), xxxii (hereafter cited in text as IE).
16 Bataille, The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge, 163.
17 Jacques Derrida offers this reading of Bataille in “From Restricted to General
Economy: A Hegelianism Without Reserve,” in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 251–77. What Derrida is discussing here is
Bataille’s reading of Hegel through Alexander Kojève. For one challenge to the Kojève/
Bataille/Derrida sequence of approaches to Hegel, see Joseph C. Flay, “Hegel, Derrida,
and Bataille’s Laughter” and Judith Butler’s response, “Commentary,” in Hegel and His
Critics: Philosophy in the Aftermath of Hegel, ed. William Desmond (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1989).
18 Bataille, “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice,” in Bataille Reader, ed. Fred Botting and Scott
Wilson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 286–87 (hereafter cited in text as H).
19 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “wake.”
20 In his reading of the Lacanian variant of this scenario, Slavoj Žižek takes a
dramatically different conceptual route to reach a similar conclusion to Bataille’s. See
Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom! Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out (New York: Routledge, 1992).
For Lacan/ Žižek, there is only one true “act” of “absolute freedom” and that is what they
call “symbolic suicide.” This is indeed, in Žižek’s words, “the point at which Lacan rejoins
Hegel” (53): “an act of ‘losing all,’ of withdrawing from symbolic reality, that enables us to
begin anew from the ‘zero point,’ from the point of absolute freedom called by Hegel
‘abstract negativity’” (43). This “symbolic suicide”—and this is important in the context of
The Awakening’s suicide interpretations—is to be strictly opposed to what Žižek calls
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“suicide ‘in reality’” (43) and, in fact, is not a suicide at all in the common sense of the
word, since it is concomitant with, in Žižek’s words, “what, in a vulgarly pathetic way, we
call a ‘new life’” (44). On the point at which Lacan joins Bataille through Hegel, see also
Julia Kristeva, “Bataille, Experience and Practice,” in On Bataille: Critical Essays, ed. Leslie
Anne Boldt-Irons (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 237–63.
21 Vladimir Propp tells us that laughter is par excellence the sign of life. See Propp,
“Ritual Laughter in Folklore (A Propos of the Tale of the Princess Who Would Not Laugh
[Nesmejána])” in Theory and History of Folklore, ed. Anatoly Liberman, trans. Ariadna Y.
Martin and Richard P. Martin (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 134.
There is, in fact, a “threshold of laughter” between life and death, and if one is forbidden
to laugh in the kingdom of the dead, any “new birth” is accompanied by laughter.
22 Michel Foucault, “A Preface to Transgression,” in Botting and Wilson, Bataille: A
Critical Reader, 24–40.
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in Bataille’s writing on eroticism, which she sees as central to his “project.” In my reading
of Bataille, laughter occupies the central place that Guerlac ascribes to eroticism. Laughter
is one element in a series that contains eroticism, poetry, and sacrifice, but it is also an
umbrella term under which these other terms are subsumed (“Laughter is the only way
out,” reads one of Bataille’s notes [IE 204]). If, instead of imagining “the extreme limit” as
a moment of eroticism, one imagines it as a moment of laughter, woman might have
another fate. Žižek reaches a similar conclusion when he writes: “but the act was hers.” See
Enjoy Your Symptom! 60.
24 Jean-Luc Nancy, “Laughter, Presence,” in The Birth to Presence, trans. Brian Holmes
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 368, my emphasis.
25 Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation, trans. Susan Hanson (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 14.
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1980).
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